diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'net-ftp/tlswrap/files/fix-Wformat-security-warnings.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | net-ftp/tlswrap/files/fix-Wformat-security-warnings.patch | 67 |
1 files changed, 67 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net-ftp/tlswrap/files/fix-Wformat-security-warnings.patch b/net-ftp/tlswrap/files/fix-Wformat-security-warnings.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e90ffffc4335 --- /dev/null +++ b/net-ftp/tlswrap/files/fix-Wformat-security-warnings.patch @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +From dbbc4b17b5fdd08b11b0f285cfc99a28be8a89e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Michael Orlitzky <michael@orlitzky.com> +Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2016 13:05:43 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Fix -Wformat-security warnings by adding trivial format + strings. + +Newer versions of GCC have the option to output warnings for insecure +(e.g. missing) format string usage. A few places were making calls to +the printf family of functions, and passing in a string variable +without a format string. In all cases, the desired format string was +simply "%s", intended to print the sole argument, and that "%s" has +been added. + +This eliminates the warnings, and allows the build to complete when +-Werror=format-security is used. +--- + misc.c | 4 ++-- + parse.c | 4 ++-- + 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c +index ebaabb2..d9bb150 100644 +--- a/misc.c ++++ b/misc.c +@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ int print_to_ud(struct user_data *ud, const char *s) { + size_t slen; + char str[1024]; + +- snprintf(str, sizeof(str), s); ++ snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "%s", s); + + slen = strlen(str); /* NOT including null char */ + +@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ int print_to_serv(struct user_data *ud, const char *s) { + size_t slen; + char str[130]; + +- snprintf(str, sizeof(str), s); ++ snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "%s", s); + slen = strlen(str); /* NOT including null char */ + if ( (&ud->u2s_buf[U2S_SIZE]-ud->u2s_i)<slen) { + printf("print_to_ud: can't fit string to buffer\n"); +diff --git a/parse.c b/parse.c +index 1174202..ac4529f 100644 +--- a/parse.c ++++ b/parse.c +@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ parse_serv_buf(struct user_data *ud, int index, char *ucertspath, char *cafile) + ud->serv_status = SERV_PBSZ; + snprintf(s, sizeof(s), "PROT %c\r\n", ud->prot); + if (debug) +- printf(s); ++ printf("%s", s); + print_to_serv(ud,s); + } else if ((ud->serv_status == SERV_PBSZ) && (strncasecmp(dst,"200 ",4) == 0) ) { + ud->serv_status = SERV_PROT; +@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ parse_serv_buf(struct user_data *ud, int index, char *ucertspath, char *cafile) + } else if (ud->delay_prot && (ud->serv_status == SERV_PROT) && (strncasecmp(dst,"230 ",4) == 0) ) { + snprintf(s, sizeof(s), "PROT %c\r\n", ud->prot); + if (debug) +- printf(s); ++ printf("%s", s); + print_to_serv(ud,s); + } else if (ud->delay_prot && (ud->serv_status == SERV_PROT) && (strncasecmp(dst,"200 ",4) == 0) ) { + write(ud->user_fd, "230 Bypassed login text because the ftpd can't handle PROT before USER.\r\n", 73); +-- +2.7.3 + |